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COMMENTS
Unifying International Patent Protection:
The World Intellectual Property
Organization Must Coordinate
Regional Patent Systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Patent protection has increasingly become a subject of interna-
tional concern for industries. With the advancement of technology
and streamlined access to international markets, inventors have a vital
interest in protecting the propriety of their inventions in foreign coun-
tries. Due to the varying regulation of patent law in different coun-
tries, however, an inventor who receives a patent in one country is
neither assured of obtaining a patent for the same invention in an-
other country, nor of having the first patent enforced there. Such dis-
crepancies have caused many companies to lose money in foreign
markets where they mistakenly believed they had a valid patent. In-
stead, local companies are free to compete with the inventor. The
foreign inventor is thus at a disadvantage.
Although the explosion of technology and the increased trade
flow among countries have escalated this problem, the need for inter-
national patent protection has existed for a long time. In 1883, the
Paris International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty ("Paris Convention")' became the first major international agree-
ment to outline the need for coordination of patent rights between the
different countries.2 The Paris Convention established national treat-
ment of patents, a twelve month priority period, a deferral of penalties
for nonworking patents, and approval of subsequent agreements for
1. Paris International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, 25 Stat. 1372, T.S. No. 379 (effective June 11, 1887) as revised, at Brussels, Dec. 14,
1900, 32 Stat. 1936, at Washington, June 2, 1911, 38 Stat. 1645, at The Hague, Nov. 6, 1925,
47 Stat. 1798, 74 L.N.T.S. 289, at London, June 2, 1934, 53 Stat. 1748, 192 L.N.T.S. 17, at
Lisbon, Oct. 31, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 1, U.N.T.S. 107, at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583,
828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
2. ULF ANDERFELT, INTERNATIONAL PATENT LEGISLATION AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 61(1971).
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cooperation among the member states. 3 These were critical points in
establishing a foundation for international patent cooperation, but
they are of little assistance in addressing the needs of modem indus-
try. For instance, the various patent systems now in existence require
an inventor to file patent applications in every country where he seeks
patent protection. 4 This duplicative effort provides for a very ineffi-
cient system. In addition, the Paris Convention failed to adequately
define the scope of protection afforded to patents, leaving the resolu-
tion of such questions to the individual states' national legislation.5
Further, the Paris Convention failed to specify the patentability of
various substances and processes.
6
In response to these needs, the United Nations established the
World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") in 1967 to per-
form the administrative activities of the Paris Convention, to protect
the rights of inventors, and to harmonize national legislation in the
context of intellectual property protection.7 WIPO has since attended
to many of the international patent community's needs.
Many problems still remain, however, including conflicting pat-
ent laws among signatories of the Paris Convention and duplicative
activities of numerous patent offices around the world. These issues
need resolution, and an international body such as WIPO can address
these issues. An international patent community needs to be better
defined. Recently, however, private concerns, who have a growing
economic interest in establishing a more uniform international patent
system, have supplied the driving force for quicker and more com-
plete coordination of the many territorial patent systems. Further,
the growth of technology in areas such as biotechnology has stimu-
lated such coordination.
Advanced technology and streamlined international markets are
relatively new developments. As a result, few patent systems have
adopted any solid regulations for patenting products in areas such as
3. Warren S. Wolfeld, International Patent Cooperation: The Next Step, 16 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 229, 235-36 (1983).
4. PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 19.01 (1982).
5. HANS COLLIN, INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEMS AND PRACTICE 11 (1977).
6. Id. at 12. The Paris Convention merely states that industrial property is to be con-
strued broadly. The Paris Convention did include agriculture, natural resources, and natural
products, but did not further specify whether foodstuffs, stimulants, drugs, or processes are
within the broad reading of "industrial property." Id.
7. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter WIPO Convention]. See also ANDERFELT,
supra note 2, at 259.
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biotechnology.8 These circumstances present WIPO with an opportu-
nity to establish a framework so that different countries will not di-
verge on different paths in their patent requirements. Further, new
markets in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the former Eastern Eu-
ropean bloc provide an even greater incentive for WIPO to administer
an international patent harmonization scheme.
This Comment will discuss the need for WIPO to immediately
address the existing problems in patent law and the international pat-
ent system. First, the discussion will focus on WIPO's potential role
in dealing with these problems. Then, it will cover the history of in-
ternational patents and the role of patents in society. This Comment
will also discuss the current flaws in international patent law and ana-
lyze how these flaws prevent existing territorial patent systems from
completely fulfilling their purpose. Next, the Comment will address
the economic and political events that mandate WIPO's instant lead-
ership in unifying and harmonizing a workable international patent
system. Finally, this Comment will conclude by analyzing several ex-
isting multinational treaties and aspects of these treaties that serve as
models for future harmonization schemes.
A. WIPO Is the Most Logical Organ to Implement International
Harmonization
The United Nations created WIPO specifically to handle harmo-
nization matters.9 Since its creation, the international patent commu-
nity has considered WIPO to be a source of guidance. WIPO serves
two general purposes: (1) coordination of the basic activities estab-
lished by the Paris Convention, and (2) promotion of all intellectual
property rights protected under the Paris Convention, as well as those
protected by special agreements.10 The creation of WIPO transferred
the administrative responsibilities of the international patent system
from the Swiss Government and BIRPI (Bureaux Internationaux
Reunis pour la Protection de la Propriete Intellectuelle) to the mem-
ber states of the Paris Convention."1 WIPO's role was not only to
administer the Paris Convention and the Union members, but also to
promote the protection of intellectual property on a worldwide
8. Michael K. Kirk, WIPO's Involvement in International Developments, 50 ALB. L.
REV. 601, 607 (1987).
9. WIPO Convention, supra note 7, art. 4.
10. ANDERFELT, supra note 2, at 259.
11. Eugene M. Braderman, The World Intellectual Property Organization and the Admin-
istrative Reorganization of BIRPI, 12 IDEA 673, 674-80 (1968).
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scale.12 Since international harmonization of patent law promotes the
protection of intellectual property worldwide, the goal of harmoniza-
tion falls well within WIPO's jurisdiction.
Many developing countries, however, contend that WIPO can-
not, and should not, operate as the exclusive competent body in the
field of patent law. Since many of these developing countries are not
currently members of the Paris Union, they have no voice in WIPO,
preventing them from exerting any influence on international patent
developments.13 These concerns were much more prevalent in the
early stages of WIPO's existence than they are now, as 126 countries
have ratified WIPO since its inception. 14 Further, WIPO has become
widely accepted by the international community as the principal
source of reform in international patent law. For example, the Soviet
Patent Office specifically consulted WIPO when considering making
changes to its patent laws. 15 The role of WIPO in leading reform in
the international patent field has solidified considerably since its crea-
tion in 1967. Correspondingly, WIPO is best suited to carry out any
necessary changes in harmonizing international law.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The historical background of patent law is helpful to understand
the current problems patents present within the international commu-
nity. As early as the fourteenth century, the Italian cities of Florence
and Venice established patents to balance the interests of the inventor
and the public. 16 Until recently, many believed that patents
originated with the English Statute of Monopolies of 1623.17 In fact,
the Venetian patent law was already over one hundred years old when
12. Id. at 682.
13. ANDERFELT, supra note 2, at 264. Anderfelt points out that the only way for such
states to exert any influence in the international field would be to join the Paris Union and
accept the present system. Id. However, increasing membership of the Paris Union may be in
the best interests of the international community since it is the first step toward achieving true
international patent harmonization. Consequently, even though Anderfelt warns against al-
lowing exclusivity of WIPO in the international field, this may provide the incentive to en-
courage more states to join the Paris Union, and harmonize international protection.
14. Monthly Review of the World Intellectual Property Organization, 29 INDUS. PROP. 3
(1990). The 126 members of WIPO exceed the 100 members of the Paris Convention. Only 31
members of WIPO are not members of the Paris Convention. Id. at 3-6.
15. Y. A. Bespalov, Industrial Property in the USSR--Status Report and Outlook, 30
INDUS. PROP. 319 (1991).
16. ANDERFELT, supra note 2, at 3-4.
17. M. Frumkin, The Early History of Patents for Invention, Paper presented to the
Chartered Institute of Patent Agents and the Newcomen Society of London (1947). It was
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the English Statute of Monopolies was first documented.1 8 The Vene-
tian Patent Act reflected many of the elements of current patent
laws.19 It recognized the incentives for establishing a patent regime:
(1) the utility of patents to society; (2) the encouragement of inven-
tiveness; (3) the refunding of the costs incurred by inventors; and (4)
the inventor's right to the fruit of his mind.
20
A common element of all these early patent systems was the de-
sire to serve the interests of the state. Both the Venetian and English
systems required the use of patents within the state. Further, both
systems forbade an inventor from raising prices too high or from be-
ing "mischievous to the state."
'2 '
The interests of the inventors, on the other hand, were not con-
sidered until the American and French Revolutions. These events es-
tablished the concepts of the inherent and inalienable rights of an
individual. 22 The concept of patents as private property emerged as
one such inalienable right.23 Eventually, the United States became a
leader in developing a patent system which would accommodate the
individual's patent rights.
24
By the nineteenth century, enough nations had developed patent
systems so that international coordination became possible. 25 How-
ever, the real need for international patent cooperation did not arise
until the industrial revolution in the nineteenth century. 26 In re-
sponse to this need, the Paris Convention created an international
framework for protecting industrial property. The Paris Convention,
however, only afforded an applicant certain minimum rights when fil-
ing an application abroad. 27 Although it did establish a consistent
initially believed that patents originated in England in the sixteenth century and other coun-
tries imitated the English system. Id.
18. ANDERFELT, supra note 2, at 3.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id. at 9.
22. Id. at 11.
23. Id. at 17-25. Anderfelt discusses the different theories under which the private prop-
erty doctrine evolved. These theories include natural law doctrine, with its emphasis on the
inherent rights of inventors, and collectivist doctrine, with its focus on the social utility of
patents. Id.
24. Per Von Holstein, International Co-operation in the Field of Patent Law with Special
Reference to the Activities of the Council of Europe, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 191, 192 (1967).
25. Id.
26. Guinter Gall, Legislative and Judicial Powers in Europe - How Far is Harmonisation
of Patent Law and Practice Possible and Desirable?, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 138 (1988).
27. Id.
1993]
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level of patent treatment among countries, it fell far short of bringing
about "harmonization of law" in the Union's Member States. 28 Under
the Paris Convention, the states remained at liberty to shape their
patent granting procedure. 29 The states could also determine the sub-
stantive law and the subjects that would be patentable.30 In response
to the need for further harmonization, the United Nations established
WIPO in 1967.31 In its twenty-four years of existence, WIPO has
achieved some harmonization of the international patent system, but
it has yet to provide a uniform system that all countries will follow.
Some countries have sought alternative ways to harmonize the
international patent system. To provide some degree of uniformity in
their patent laws, various countries have banded together by treaty to
establish a patent cooperation standard for all member countries. The
European Patent Convention3 2 and the Community Patent Conven-
tion33 are examples of such efforts among industrial nations in Eu-
rope. The European Patent Convention established an office that
grants a single patent, referred to as a European Patent, which is valid
in all the party nations that the applicant designates. The Community
Patent Convention takes this one step further, allowing an applicant
who designates a European Economic Community ("EEC") 4 mem-
ber as a target to obtain a patent covering all EEC countries.35 These
progressive movements in the EEC resolve many problems among
EEC member states facing the international community. Similarly,
some African states have banded together to minimize both the costs
of a patent system and the resulting administrative burden. These
states joined the Afro-Malagasy Convention, which was signed in
1962 and entered into force in 1964.36
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. WIPO Convention, supra note 7.
32. The Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) [hereinafter European Patent Convention], reprinted in J. SINNOTr,
WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 2K (1982).
33. Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, Dec. 15, 1975 [herein-
after Community Patent Convention], reprinted in SINNOT, supra note 32, at 21.
34. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
35. Community Patent Convention, supra note 33, arts. 2, 3, reprinted in SINNOT, supra
note 32, at 21.
36. The Agreement Relating to the Creation of an African and Malagasy Industrial
Property Office and its Annexes, Sept. 13, 1962 [hereinafter Afro-Malagasy Model], reprinted
in SINNOTT, supra note 32, at 2J. See also ANDERFELT, supra note 2, at 105.
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This historical background indicates the trend in patent law over
the last several hundred years. Patent law initially emerged as a terri-
torial concern to meet the needs of the state, but has become a subject
of international scrutiny. The Paris Convention and the establish-
ment of WIPO were indicators that the international community real-
ized the potential benefits of harmonizing certain aspects of patent
law. Still, the Community Patent Convention and the Afro-Malagasy
Convention indicate that the international community seeks harmoni-
zation which to date WIPO has been unable to provide.
III. PURPOSE OF PATENTS
Many of the reasons for the development of patent systems in the
old Venetian and English patent acts are still valid today. These in-
clude serving the interests of society and advancing technology.
However, the main reason for a patent system is to encourage inven-
tion and innovation. 37 The need for encouragement exists because
without it inventors would not undertake the risks and costs of pursu-
ing an invention. Incurring such costs would not be worthwhile if
others could use the invention and reap its profits. 38 Without protec-
tion, no one would spend the time and money required to invent and
the only inventions would be "those made by chance or by persons
impervious to financial losses."' 39 The patent system gives the patent
37. PAUL DEMARET, PATENTS, TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS, AND EEC LAW 3 (1978).
Demaret distinguishes between invention and innovation in the field of economics. Invention
is defined as technical knowledge not ready for commercial use while innovation is the act of
bringing a new idea, not just a technical concept, to commercial exploitation. Demaret modi-
fies this definition to state that an innovation is an invention that has become economically
useful. Id. at 5. He justifies this definition based on the reality that once a new idea has been
devised, more investment is required before the idea can be successfully marketed. Id.
Several authors espouse other justifications for a patent system, considering them to be
just as important reasons as innovation and invention. See FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC
REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM STUDY No. 15, SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADE-
MARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE U.S. SENATE,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-43, 52-55 (1958). Some authors believe that the natural property right
theory is the driving force for a patent system. They claim the idea, upon its creation, is the
natural right of the inventor and is protected by the patent system. See WARD S. BOWMAN
JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 12-13 (1973). Others believe that the exchange-for-
secrets theory underlies the patent system. Id. Still others advocate that a distributive justice
theory is the basis for the system. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the
Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
38. DEMARET, supra note 37, at 4. The costs involved in inventing can be very high
because they involve considerable research and development. Id. In contrast, the cost of using
an invention is usually minimal.
39. Id. at 4.
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owner a temporary monopoly of a piece of new technical knowledge.
As a result, the patent owner can regulate the use of this knowledge,
thereby creating an economic value for such knowledge.4°
Others argue that the patent system does not provide incentive to
innovate.41 Since developing a patented invention often requires more
work than the actual invention itself, they argue the incentive must
cover both invention and innovation. 42 Much of the development
work required in manufacturing an invention is not patentable.
Therefore, these authors argue that a patent system does not really
provide an incentive to develop such inventions and cannot provide
an incentive for innovation. 43
Regardless of whether patents serve the needs of innovation,
their primary purpose still remains to provide an incentive for
invention.
IV. REASONS FOR INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION
Although individual countries implement patent systems to ac-
complish the purposes outlined above, they are not always successful.
The incentive for innovation, which patent law offers inventors, is
often stifled by the varying patent laws of different countries. Interna-
tional harmonization of patent law would address both the operation
of the patent system and the patent laws themselves in order to maxi-
mize this incentive.
A. The Patent System
Harmonizing the international patent system would entail or-
ganizing the current systems of applying for patents, granting patents,
and litigating conflicts on a worldwide scale. One major drawback of
the current system is the duplicity of various patent offices' efforts.
The patent office of each country separately examines the application
of an inventor to determine its patentability. Another drawback is the
conflicting case law of different countries, which occurs despite identi-
cal patent regulation. Finally, the current international patent system
needs to better define the role of lesser developed countries whose
goals differ from those of industrialized nations.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Corwin D. Edwards, Antitrust and Patent Laws: Effects on Innovation, 56 AMER.
ECON. REV. 311 (1966).
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1. Duplicity of Effort and Case Law
The patent system's first improvement is the elimination of the
present multiplicity of effort extant among various patent offices.
Currently, an inventor who seeks protection in several countries must
file separate patent applications in the patent office of each country.
Often, the inventor will file just to meet the countries' deadlines, with-
out addressing the commercial viability of the invention in those
countries." Nonetheless, in order to maintain those markets as pos-
sibilities, he must file separate patent applications. This repetition
burdens not only the inventor, but also society. Each national patent
office performs its own search to determine if the patent already ex-
ists, resulting in duplicative use of resources and personnel.45
This duplicative process affects the prosecution phase of the pat-
ent as well. When each nation applies its own laws in prosecuting the
patent and addressing issues of patentability, it is performing the same
tasks as other nations regarding that patent grant.46 To eliminate this
wasteful process, a single office could perform the necessary searches
and apply a uniform law. This would lower the inventor's costs and
the public's, since it is their taxes that fund the patent office.
Another problem that requires a uniform international patent
system stems from the existence of conflicting case law. The stand-
ardization of patent law in all countries is not enough to maintain a
workable system, since it is the courts that decide the sufficiency of
the patent application, in addition to other requirements. Thus, even
if every country had patent laws worded identically, it "does not
mean that case law is brought into line."' 47 WIPO must regulate the
patent system worldwide by providing guidelines so that individual
courts will interpret the patent law similarly. Europe has taken a step
in this direction by harmonizing the application of patent laws in the
courts. National court decisions indicate that European courts are
trying to standardize their case law and respect the decisions of other
courts.4 Any uniform system that WIPO adopts must have a similar
provision requiring the courts of member countries to apply patent
laws uniformly.
Another major problem confronting national patent institutions
44. Wolfeld, supra note 3, at 232.
45. Id. at 233.
46. Id.
47. Gall, supra note 26, at 139 (emphasis in original).
48. Id. at 139-40.
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is the existence of international restrictive business practices. 49 There
must be an international body to handle such problems. Individual
nations often do not have the jurisdiction to deal with extraterritorial
or multinational problems. WIPO's anticipated role would be instru-
mental in administering laws and procedures to limit restrictive busi-
ness practices on an international scale.
2. Lesser Developed Countries
Perhaps the most critical problem facing the present interna-
tional patent system is the role of developing, or lesser developed,
countries. A growing number of developing countries have become
members of the Paris Union, indicating a desire for, rapid industriali-
zation.50 If these countries can establish certain basic technologies,
then technology will more easily flow from the more advanced to the
lesser developed countries. 51 Currently, there are several countries
without any patent system and five others that, for lack of a better
system, adopted the entire patent systems of another country. 52 An
international patent system will be difficult to maintain if some of its
members do not have their own patent systems.53 Thus, the first step
to acclimating lesser developed countries to the international patent
realm is to encourage each to develop a patent system that meets the
guidelines of the international system.
Another obstacle developing countries pose to the international
patent community relates to the cost of establishing and maintaining
an international patent system. Such a system will require additional
costs and fees from the member states, a burden that will weigh more
heavily on lesser developed countries. 54 These countries cannot afford
the manpower and the costs of a patent office review procedure, which
are normally critical components of the patent systems of industrial
49. U.N. DEP'T. OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL, THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/3861/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 65 II.B.1 (1964). [hereinafter
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL].
50. DEMARET, supra note 37, at 111.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 114.
53. Id.
54. DEMARET, supra note 37, at 126. Demaret suggests that the costs to these countries
should be counterweighed against the economic benefits of the inflow of technology. Id. He
adds that comparing the cost of granting patents to foreigners cannot solely be compared with
the benefits of national patentees abroad. Id.
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countries. 55
Additionally, there may be economic costs associated with an in-
ternational patent system. Protection of foreign technology will make
imported goods and technology more expensive. Since the increase in
costs of imports into such countries is related to the imports' patent
protection, some countries may be more reluctant to grant patents to
foreigners5 6 Though the international patent system would result in
an initial financial burden on lesser developed countries, 57 the exact
costs are difficult to quantify for the following reasons: (1) it is not
possible to quantify the gains and losses of a country participating in
the international patent system; (2) it is not possible to measure the
benefit to the world as a whole from technological advancements in
technology; and (3) it is not possible to quantify the incentives for
innovation offered by the international patent system.
58
Despite the increased economic costs, developing countries have
a strong interest in forming and becoming a member of a uniform
international patent community since it allows them to obtain foreign
advanced technology. 59 Specifically, an international patent system
would increase the flow of technology to developing countries' local
economies. 6° Inventors with information that may not otherwise be
as easily accessible to such countries, now have an incentive to pro-
duce and develop their ideas in the new markets, and feel secure in the
protection a uniform system provides. Additionally, the uniform in-
ternational patent system would serve not only to transfer technology,
but also to promote its creation. Issuing international patents to resi-
dents of lesser developed countries would promote the development of
technology within that country to a greater extent than a national
patent. 61 An international patent would apply in foreign countries
where the market for the invention may be more lucrative than at
home. Consequently, international patents would provide impetus for
inventors to advance technology within the lesser developed country.
Clearly, there is both a need for the international system to ac-
commodate developing countries and the desire of those countries to
55. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, supra note 49, at 3.
56. DEMARET, supra note 37, at 127.
57. Id. at 128.
58. EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYS-
TEM 96 (1951).
59. DEMARET, supra note 37, at 131.
60. ANDERFELT, supra note 2, at 142.
61. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, supra note 49, at 5.
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join this system. Most likely, the international system will attend to
the needs of these countries. However, to be complete the present
discussion requires a further analysis of potential problems for devel-
oping countries under the international system. Indeed, many of
these problems may occur regardless of whether an international sys-
tem exists.
One major concern of the developing countries is that an interna-
tional system will exhibit a nationalistic bias against foreign countries.
In national patent legislation, the conflicts are generally between an
individual's rights and the best interests of society. In the interna-
tional realm these same conflicts exist with an added dimension; i.e.,
the likelihood that a state will side with its nationals when a conflict
occurs between that national and another country's interests. When
the state backs its own citizen in a conflict with a lesser developed
country, the developing country must resist pressures from the indi-
vidual, as well as from the foreign country. 62 Such a conflict is likely
to conclude with a result favoring the stronger technologically ad-
vanced country to the detriment of the developing country. Corre-
spondingly, an international system may not adequately serve the
needs of the developing country. 63
Another potential problem with an international patent system is
that an international patent might be neglected in a less developed
country. This occurs, for example, when the inventor chooses not to
work the patent in that country. As a result, the country suffers in
two ways. First, the country is paying for the patent by virtue of its
membership in the international system. Second, the country is de-
prived of advanced technology. 64 WIPO must address these concerns,
even after it establishes an international system.
While the continued internationalization of the patent system
may result in these problems, they do not provide sufficient reason to
avoid such a movement. On the contrary, these problems illustrate
why WIPO should standardize the international patent system with
regulations, taking such concerns into consideration. These problems
may arise even without the further internationalization of the patent
62. DEMARET, supra note 37, at 133.
63. STOJAN PRETNAR, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
AND THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATES 213-21 (1953).
But see Stephen P. Ladas, The Fundamental Bases of the International Protection of Industrial
Property, 70 P.I. 93-97 (1954). Ladas claims that the WIPO Convention only takes into ac-
count private interests, and not those of the states siding with the private entities. Id.
64. PENROSE, supra note 58, at 106-07.
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system.65 In fact, the significant differences in technology and capital
among the industrial and the lesser developed countries will remain a
source of continued conflict among these entities in the patent
world. 66 WIPO's role is to alleviate the concerns of lesser developed
countries by developing a logical international system to minimize the
potential problems.
To this end, WIPO has implemented a development cooperation
program specifically designed to meet the needs of developing coun-
tries.67 This program is geared toward assisting developing countries
with modernizing their patent laws, facilitating legislation, encourag-
ing domestic creativity, and promoting access to technological infor-
mation. 68 WIPO, however, should be cautious while aiding the
development of these countries' patent systems. These systems may
develop to serve the needs of each country independently. If so, fu-
ture harmonization in the international arena may be even more diffi-
cult. To avoid this difficulty, WIPO should encourage these countries
to part with some immediate national advantages, so that future har-
monization will be easier on a global scale.
B. Changes in the Patent Law
A second reason for international standardation is that the cur-
rent patent laws of the international community lack uniformity in
several areas. This lack of uniformity exists not in the laws them-
selves, but rather in the regulations countries have imposed to effectu-
ate them. This large discrepancy among nations subjects the
inventors to uncertainty, loss of patent rights, and economic waste.
69
65. DEMARET, supra note 37, at 125.
66. Regina A. Loughran, The United States Position on Revising the Paris Convention:
Quid Pro Quo or Denunciation, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 420-23 (1982). The activities of the
Group of 77 provide evidence of past conflicts between developing and industrial countries.
The 77 developing countries banded together at the first United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) to voice their demands, raising issues of foreign dependence on
technology and imports as areas of change necessary to international patents. United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, G.A. Res. 1995, U.N. GAOR, 19th Sess., Supp. No.
15, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/5815 (1964).
67. WIPO-Overview of Activities and Developments in 1989, 29 INDUS. PROP. 33 (1990).
68. Id.
69. COLLIN, supra note 5, at 26. Dr. Collin examines advantages and disadvantages of
filing under each of the various patent systems that exist in Europe. For example, he considers
the European Patent Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, and the Common Market
Patent Convention. Dr. Collin claims that one must examine each case individually to find the
most favorable protection for a patent. Only after such considerations can one then determine
the most beneficial patent system under which to file. Id. at 31.
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These discrepancies will nullify the incentives for invention that the
patent system offers. They may also lead to a decrease in the interna-
tional transfer of ideas. Further, these discrepancies will lead to pat-
ent litigation over differing regulations. Currently, several areas of
patent law are vigorously contested internationally.
1. Prior Art Effect
One example of the lack of uniformity in the international patent
system is the role of the "prior art effect" of patents. The term "prior
art effect" refers to the use of a patent to determine whether an inven-
tion in a later filed patent application is new. 70 This is an area where
the law of the United States, the largest industrial nation, differs from
that of other countries in the international community. The Paris
Convention provides that the filing date of the first filed application
operates as the filing date for granting subsequent patents in other
member countries. 7' In addition, most other countries recognize the
filing date as the effective date for patent-defeating purposes. 72 The
United States only follows the Paris Convention's prioritization
system when granting patents. For patent-defeating purposes, the
United States does not recognize the filing date of a foreign applica-
tion. 73 It only recognizes the date that the patent was filed in the
United States, even if it was filed on an earlier date in another coun-
try. 74 International harmonization will not be possible unless WIPO
attends to prior art effect in patent defeating cases.
70. Kirk, supra note 8, at 603.
71. Id.
72. However, the first filing date can be used only if subsequent filings in other member
countries are filed within one year of the first filing. Id. The term "patent-defeating purposes"
refers to using one patent's existence, or, in this case the patent's filing, as evidence that a
subsequent patent is not new and unobvious. In fact, the previous existence of such patents is
evidence that a "prior art effect" existed. This evidence is used to defeat a current application
for a patent. The United States only differs from the Paris Convention on the prior art effect
use of foreign filing dates. Id.
73. See In Re Hilmer, 424 F.2d 1108 (C.C.P.A. 1970), describing 35 U.S.C. § 119 as a
tool to be used only as a shield, and not as a sword to defeat a patent. The previous filing date
of a foreign application is only valid under § 119 if it will save a patent in a priority dispute. In
other words it can be used as evidence that a patent being objected to was actually conceived
or reduced to practice on the date of the foreign application. But a party cannot use such a
foreign filing date to show that a prior art existed that would defeat a patent in the interference
proceeding. Id. at 1112. The court reasoned that the legislative history of § 102(g) clearly
indicates this. Id.
74. Kirk, supra note 8, at 603.
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2. Grace Period
Another area lacking uniformity is the allotted grace period for
patent application. In the United States, an inventor has one year
after disclosing his invention to file a patent application.7 5 Not al-
lowing any grace period, other countries maintain that any disclosure
prior to filing the patent nullifies the inventor's ability to obtain a
patent. 76 As a result, while the grace period is of valuable protection
to applicants in the United States who may first want to examine the
marketability of a product, "it is a trap with respect to filing
abroad."
77
WIPO should establish a uniform patent filing grace period.
This harmonization would benefit American inventors who want
to test their goods in foreign markets before applying for a patent. A
uniform grace period would also help the inventors in the scientific
community who are pressured to publish regularly and who may not
have time to first apply for a patent.78 The establishment of a uniform
patent filing grace period, however, is not without problems. In Eu-
rope, for example, it would be particularly difficult to adopt a grace
period since it cannot be introduced gradually, nor applied in several
stages. 79 Also, because of the time required to pass legislation, indus-
trial nations may be unable to implement the grace period
simultaneously. 80
Because of the implementation problems, WIPO has generated a
tremendous amount of controversy with respect to the grace period
debate. A country's position on the grace period varies depending on
whether the country is a first to file or a first to invent territory. 8' An
analysis of the debate is significant to the present discussion because,
depending on which course WIPO chooses to follow (first to file or
first to invent), maintaining or discarding the grace period will have
corresponding advantages and disadvantages in the harmonization of
the international patent system.
Currently, the United States is the only remaining state that fol-
75. The United States permits the inventor a grace period before filing the patent applica-
tion and is considered a "first to invent" country. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b).
76. Countries that do not permit a grace period are considered "first to file" countries.
77. Kirk, supra note 8, at 604.
78. Id.
79. Gall, supra note 26, at 140.
80. Id.
81. H. Bardehle, The WIPO Harmonization Treaty and the Grace Period, 30 INDUS.
PROP. 372, 373 (1991).
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lows a first to invent system. Under this system, the grace period is
not only harmless in facilitating the determination of the true inven-
tor, but is actually helpful in determining who was the first to in-
vent. 82 Alternatively, in a first to file jurisdiction, third parties have a
right to use the invention when it is disclosed during the grace period.
Such use may cause conflicts when the inventor later files for a patent,
because even though the inventor may be the first to file, the third
party can claim prior use.83 In a first to invent jurisdiction, the only
question is whether the prior user or the subsequent applicant was
actually the first to invent.84
Despite opposition to instituting a grace period in the harmoni-
zation proposal of WIPO, a grace period does not pose any significant
drawbacks, even to first to file countries. Although it is theoretically
possible to have a right of prior use arise during the grace period, such
instances are rare. 5 By the time a potential third party user investi-
gates the invention's potential, produces it, and develops the required
drawings to qualify for prior use, the allotted grace period will nor-
mally have expired.86 Alternatively, if the grace period has expired,
then the original inventor can no longer file for a patent, and no con-
flict will arise.
Assuming that grace periods are workable in both first to file and
first to invent systems, one must examine the benefits of the grace
period. The grace period serves as a "safety net. . . to catch unavoid-
able or unintentional prior disclosure on the part of the inventor.
'8 7
Unavoidable or unintended prior disclosure occurs if during the test-
ing of a possible invention, the inventor has no choice but to expose
the product in the open. If such disclosure occurs, the inventor can
still apply for the patent when he has fully developed the product.
Unavoidable or unintended prior disclosure occurs frequently in in-
dustry, especially in agricultural appliances, manufacturing goods,
shoes, and chemical products.8 8
The grace period safety net also aids scientists who invent while
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. In the United States, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) limits the grace period to one year from the
date an inventor sells or allows public use of his invention. This way, prior use functions as
prior art; it limits the patentee's rights and does not favor another's patent in a priority contest.
85. Bardehle, supra note 81, at 373.
86. Id. at 374.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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involved in their research. Often, these scientists are required to pub-
lish and the lack of a grace period may deprive them of the fruits of
their work.89 Clearly, a grace period tailor-made for the patent
scheme that WIPO intends to implement internationally would "facil-
itate the . . . aim of WIPO to achieve worldwide harmonization of
patent law." 90
3. First to File System
Another discrepancy in the international patent system is the cri-
teria used to determine priority between competing patents. Given
the United States' technological impact on the world market, interna-
tional harmonization of patent law would be difficult without the
United States also adopting the first to file system. This difference in
patent priorities leads to confusion, especially for American inventors
who may be the first to invent, but not having been the first to file in
other countries, receive no protection there.
WIPO has attempted to convince the United States to change to
a first to file system,9' causing many groups within the United States
to voice their opposition.92 Though this is not the first time that such
a change has been suggested in the United States, 93 the failure of past
efforts shows that the first to invent system is securely embedded in
the United States patent system.94
There are many reasons given for opposing the first to file sys-
tem. One reason is that the first to file system would result in hasty
filings by inventors with minimal experimental data, in order to file as
89. Id. at 375.
90. Id. at 376.
91. Id.
92. The opposition in the United States was strong enough that during a WIPO diplo-
matic conference, a delegation from the United States proposed keeping the first to invent
system in exchange for giving up section 35 U.S.C. § 104 and the In Re Hilmer doctrine,
which limit the admissibility of foreign activity and foreign filing dates in the courts of the
United States. Albert Tramposch, International Harmonization of Patent Law, Paper
presented to the International Meeting on Harmonization of Patent Laws 4-5 (May 7-8, 1992,
John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois). This willingness to compromise was due to the
opposition to first to file and the "unlikelihood that the [United States] Congress would pass
first to file legislation." Id.
93. Mark T. Banner & John J. McDonnell, First-to-file, Mandatory Reexamination, and
Mandatory "Exceptional Circumstance": Ideas for Better? or Worse?, 69 J. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF. Soc'y 595, 596 (1987).
94. Id. at 596-601.
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soon as possible. 95 Another reason is that the first to file system
would result in the filing of a large number of applications that would
otherwise not be filed. 96 However, many commentators in the United
States refute this reasoning.97 They contend that neither of these rea-
sons are significant because many companies "file counterparts of
their U.S. applications abroad, in countries [that] have first-to-file sys-
tems." 98 These companies act as if they were already in a first to file
jurisdiction, filing their applications as soon as possible.99 This is
clearly an effect that the international patent community has had on
the United States patent system. Thus, changing to such a system will
not increase the number of applications. 100 The commentators also
contend that the quality of patent applications will not drop because
United States patent law requires an enablement standard under sec-
tion 112 of the Patent Code. 0 1 The enablement standard requires in-
ventors to disclose enough information to enable someone in the art to
work the invention. Eventually, under the influence of WIPO and
domestic opposition to the current system, the United States will
switch to the first to file system. Therefore, harmonization, in at least
this one area, will be achieved.
The alternative to first to file is regulating the international pat-
ent system on a first to invent basis. Converting the international
arena to a first to invent system is an unreasonable proposition be-
cause it would require every country in the world to change to the
United States' system. Another reason for rejecting an international
95. Donald R. Dunner, First to File: Should Our Interference System be abolished?, 68 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 561, 563 (1986).
96. Id. at 564.
97. See generally id.
98. Dunner, supra note 95, at 563.
99. Id.
100. Id. But see Banner & McDonnell, supra note 93, at 603-04. They argue that the
concept that the United States is currently functioning as a first to file jurisdiction only applies
to large corporations and not to small businesses or individual inventors. For a small business
or individual inventor, a first to file system would mean that it would have no chance if a large
corporation, with its efficient patent processing department, files earlier. The smaller entity
would have no recourse, even though it was the first inventor. Id.
101. News and Comment, Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 44, at 4 (1992).
Section 112 reads in pertinent part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the man-
ner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as
to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode con-
templated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
470 [Vol. 15:453
Unifying Patent Protection
first to invent system is that the system requires interference proceed-
ings to determine which party was, in fact, the first to invent a prod-
uct. 0 2  These interference proceedings are costly and time
consuming.103 Incorporating the first to invent system on an interna-
tional scale would be unimaginably burdensome, both to international
and regional patent offices. This option, then, is neither a practical
possibility for international harmonization, nor a desirable one.
4. Process Patents
Process patents pose another obstacle to international harmoni-
zation. Process patents differ from traditional patents in that the pat-
ent is granted for a process that yields a product, and not the product
itself. Internationally, there is differing treatment for process patents;
the process may be patentable, while the product it produces may not
be.'°4 Japan and many European countries allow a process patent to
protect both the process and the resulting product. The United
States, on the other hand, protects only the process. 10
5
To alleviate such discrepancies, WIPO proposes that all coun-
tries extend patent protection to the resulting product, as well as to
the product process. This rule would "create a presumption that a
product, if it is a new product, was made by the patented process." 106
This presumption is helpful in cases dealing with products that
originated in foreign countries. Interested parties may find it difficult
to determine how that product was made. The presumption shifts the
burden to the defendant to prove how it manufactured the product. 10 7
Clearly, the defendant is in a better position to show that the product
did not result from the patented process.' 0 8 The WIPO proposal is a
compromise between the United States system that gives no protec-
tion to the product and the European system that gives full
protection.
V. REASONS NOT TO STANDARDIZE INTERNATIONAL PATENTS
Although harmonization of patents in international markets has
102. Dunner, supra note 95, at 561.
103. Id. at 562.
104. Ralph Oman, Technology and Intellectual Property: The View from Capitol Hill, 50
ALB. L. REV. 523 (1986).
105. Kirk, supra note 8, at 603.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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strong advantages, some authors argue that other options exist. These
options include maintaining territoriality and eliminating the need for
patents. The following discussion will examine these options and
compare them with international patent harmonization.
Advocates of maintaining territoriality claim that it will promote
competition among products.1°9 They argue that international pat-
ents prevent would-be producers from manufacturing the invention in
some countries. 110 These are countries in which the inventor has cho-
sen, for marketing or financial reasons, not to manufacture the inven-
tion. I With a harmonized international patent system, other would-
be producers are precluded from manufacturing the invention because
it is protected in all nations. Without some driving force to exploit its
patent, the inventor denies the invention's usefulness in those nations.
Alternatively, in the existing territorial patent system, inventors do
not apply for patents in countries where they have no financial inter-
est in developing the invention. Thus, manufacturers are free to pro-
duce the invention in those countries.
Territoriality advocates further argue that territoriality will ad-
vance the interests of a country that has different incentives for pat-
enting than other countries." 2  For example, the former Soviet
Union's patent law was aimed at distributing knowledge about inven-
tions, rather than providing an incentive for innovation."l3 Conse-
quently, in a territorial patent system, the newly-emerging former
Soviet nations can maintain the separate provisions of patent laws to
continue to emphasize information distribution. An international
patent system aimed at increasing invention would necessarily conflict
with those goals.' 14
109. Brian Cheffins, Exclusive Territorial Rights in Patent Licenses and Article 85 of the
EEC Treaty: An Evaluation of Recent Developments in the Law, 10 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 53, 54-55 (1987).
110. Paul S. Haar, Revision of the Paris Convention: A Realignment of Private and Public
Interests in the International Patent System, 8 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 77, 86 (1982).
111. Id.
112. Peter B. Maggs, The Restructuring of the Soviet Law of Inventions, 28 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 277, 278 (1990).
113. Id. Although the new Soviet Patent Law is designed to provide more incentive for
innovation, its sponsors disagree on the extent of incentive that should be offered at the ex-
pense of distribution of knowledge. Id. Because the individual republics are able to regulate
their own patent laws, the disagreement on the purpose of patent laws will cause more conflict.
114. But see Guillermo Cabanellas, The Consequences of Stricter Working Requirements
for Patentees Under the Paris Convention, 19 IIC 158 (1988). The author analyzes the effect of
working requirements on an inventor. A working requirement initiates a system of compul-
sory licensing if the inventor fails to exercise his patent within a country. Id. at 165. Cabanel-
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One alternative to the harmonization of the international patent
system is the elimination of the patent system in favor of a compul-
sory licensing scheme. This approach would give a compulsory li-
cense to developers if the patentee fails to exploit his license within a
certain number of years. 1 5 A compulsory licensing scheme will elim-
inate the incentive to invent as well as the incentive to develop and
introduce inventions. 11 6 Furthermore, innovators will not be moti-
vated to develop and register an invention, if after several years they
may be entitled to a license worth much less than a patent.
Another alternative to a patent system is a general and special
reward system." 7 Alexander Hamilton suggested compensating in-
ventors by paying them a general reward for discoveries and a special
award for allowing the information to be distributed throughout in-
dustry. 1 8 These systems, however, are arbitrary and have corruptive
potential.' 9  For the aforementioned reasons, neither a system of
compulsory licensing nor an awards system will serve the world's
needs in determining a future course for international patent law.
VI. NEED FOR IMMEDIATE WIPO ACTION
The need for a uniform international patent system is exemplified
by conflicting patent laws of different nations, the difficulty of ob-
taining patents in foreign countries, 120 combined with the different in-
terpretations of foreign courts. WIPO is the organization best suited
to implement such a system. 12' However, WIPO can ill afford to wait
las concludes that stricter enforcement of a patent's working requirement is a deterrent to the
inventor's holding his patent. Id. at 165-75.
115. ANDERFELT, supra note 2, at 60.
116. Id. There are other drawbacks to a compulsory licensing scheme. First, many coun-
tries complain that the Paris Convention procedures are too burdensome to rectify a non-
working patent. Haar, supra note 110, at 90. Also, obstacles to granting a compulsory license
range from the expense of commencing such proceedings to the ease with which a patentee,
through a mere advertisement, can show an attempt at working the patent. Id. But most
importantly, a compulsory license will have little value without the disclosure of information
necessary for the effective utilization of the patented invention. Id.
117. ANDERFELT, supra note 2, at 62.
118. Id. at 62-63.
119. Id.
120. See Ginter Keller, European Patent Office Practice: Some Aspects of Interest for US.
Applicants, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 912, 923 (1989).
121. WIPO has already submitted a draft patent harmonization treaty to be considered at
the Paris Union Assembly's diplomatic conference in July, 1993. News and Comment, supra
note 101, at 3. WIPO is the leader in international harmonization. Id. In addition, most
countries accept WIPO as the authority in promoting the protection of intellectual property
throughout the world. Id. Slovenia, a former Soviet Republic, has declared its recognition of
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before implementing uniformity. There have been numerous changes
to the world political framework, including the fragmentation of the
former Soviet Union and the end of the Communist bloc seclusion
from international markets. These changes challenge WIPO to ad-
minister patent regulation in these new countries in a clear and coher-
ent manner.
Clearly, the current problems in the international patent system
result from each nation independently adopting its own laws, focusing
on its own self interest. 122 In fact, "such individual self-interest leads,
when unchecked, to an inefficient industrial property order, that
makes a universal industrial property agreement meaningful."' 123 As
a result, the main reason for the immediate organization of interna-
tional patent law is that any delay would allow these countries to cre-
ate their own patent laws and thereby make future harmonization
even more difficult.
A. World Changes
One of the major changes in the world economic and political
system is the secession of the republics from the Soviet Union and
their inclusion in the international market. Prior to its breakup, the
Soviet Union had adopted a new Soviet patent law. 124 The Soviet
Union consulted WIPO in creating this law because of the possible
difficulty in changing it later when an international system was estab-
lished.' 25 The Soviet patent law may be adopted in whole or in part
by the republics. Several aspects of this law pose potential obstacles
to the future standardization of the Soviet republics' law with that of
the international community.
One potential obstacle is Soviet patent law's establishment of a
new court system. It enables the Peoples' Court to hear cases involv-
ing inventions that do not properly meet the jurisdiction of patent
courts. 26 The new Soviet patent law also establishes regional patent
the convention establishing WIPO. Notifications Concerning Treaties Administered by WIPO
in the Field of Industrial Property, 31 INDUS. PROP. 211 (1992). Czechoslovakia has similarly
submitted to WIPO its depository for the collection of microorganisms for approval. Id. at
211-14.
122. STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS § 174, at 283
(1975).
123. Cabanellas, supra note 114, at 183.
124. Bespalov, supra note 15, at 319.
125. Id.
126. Iosif E. Mamiofa, The Draft of a New Soviet Patent Law, 12 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 21, 25 (1990).
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courts in recognition of the territorial rights of every republic.' 77
Even if the new republics do not adopt the Soviet patent law, the
existence of any regional courts will perpetuate continued interpreta-
tional differences.
Of greater concern is the fact that each republic will adopt its
own version of a patent system. The current system does not inhibit
unfair competitions nor does it protect manufacturing secrets or inte-
grated circuits.'28 The republics will be free to legislate independently
in these areas. If the republics pursue independent patent systems,
then standardizing their patent systems with that of the international
community will be even more difficult than before. WIPO should
work with the individual republics as it did with the Soviet Union to
encourage them to develop laws consistent with international princi-
ples. WIPO could even try to encourage the republics to adopt the
elements that WIPO views essential to the future international patent
system.
The former Soviet patent law and the current Czechoslovakian
patent law were developed in this spirit. The product of WIPO influ-
ence, the new Czech law is aimed at serving as a basis for future im-
provements. 2 9 Specifically, the new Czech patent law is the result of
WIPO's work towards harmonizing international patent law. 130 Simi-
larly, the requirements concerning the patentability of an invention
closely resemble those of the European Patent Convention, requiring
new inventions and an inventive step.' 31 WIPO also influenced the
drafting of the new Chinese patent law. In drafting this law, WIPO
members were instrumental in suggesting and implementing aspects
of the patent laws of member countries. 32 WIPO members must be
as involved with the development of the new Soviet republics' patent
systems as they were with the Czech, Chinese, and former Soviet pat-
ent laws. To this end, WIPO has contacted several of the former So-
viet republics and WIPO's director general discussed mutual interest
issues with their representatives. 33 However, for these efforts to be
effective, they must include all of the new republics and contain more
127. Id. at 39-40. See also Maggs, supra note 112, at 277.
128. Bespalov, supra note 15, at 323.
129. L. Jaki, The New Czechoslovak Patent Law, 30 INDUS. PROP. 325 (1991).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 325-26.
132. Ma Yaoyang, International Cooperation at the Patent Office of the People's Republic
of China, 29 INDUS. PROP. 415 (1990).
133. Activities of WIPO in the Field of Industrial Property Specially Designed for European
Countries in Transition to Market Economy, 31 INDUS. PROP. 227 (1992). For example, be-
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detail, in order to develop consistent patent systems in these coun-
tries. WIPO must primarily concentrate on developing systems that
are easily adaptable to the future international patent system under
the Patent Cooperation Treaty. 34
B. Technological Changes
Technological changes in several scientific fields also mandate
speedy action by WIPO. Biotechnology is one such field. It has
progressed significantly during the last twenty years. Consequently,
old laws on exclusion from patentability and disclosure need to be
reevaluated. 135 In fact, this reevaluation is extremely important given
the number of existing treaties that cover varying facets of biotechno-
logical patents. 36 Because of the field's intricacy and complexity,
biotechnology needs standard regulations. 37 The industrial countries
currently involved in biotechnology have begun to formulate their
own patent laws, which could diverge in different directions, making
future harmonization more difficult. WIPO's immediate concern
should be to standardize biotechnology regulations or, alternatively,
create guidelines for countries to follow as they develop their own
biotechnology regulations.
Genetic engineering is another field related to biotechnology that
is growing rapidly. International patent regulation in this developing
field raises unresolved issues. Foremost among these is the disclosure
requirement of patents. 38 In the European Community, the disclo-
sure of the invention must describe one variant so that a skilled per-
son can duplicate the invention. 139 This problem raises the possibility
of unknown or undiscovered variants in the genetic invention that
may nevertheless be included within the patent. 14 ' To clarify the ex-
act scope of patents with respect to the disclosure of genetic inven-
tween April and May of 1992, WIPO directors met with officials from the patent and techno-
logical departments of Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and the Ukraine. Id.
134. See discussion infra part VII.D.
135. E. Gutmann, The Protection of Biotechnological Inventions Within the Framework of
the European Patent Organisation and, More Particularly, in France, 30 INDUS. PRoP. 377
(1991).
136. Kirk, supra note 8, at 607. These treaties include the European Patent Convention
and the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. Id.
137. Id.
138. Keller, supra note 120, at 916.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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tions and in the general field of biotechnology, WIPO must establish
uniform guidelines before the territorial rules begin to diverge.
VII. SOLUTIONS
The discrepancies and the duplicity of effort extant in the various
patent law systems, combined with the needs of developing countries,
mandate a solution to the international patent system. Establishing
an international patent system in some form is not only necessary, but
should be implemented as soon as possible. No other form of infor-
mation transfer distributes knowledge of the current state of technol-
ogy as well as the international patent system.141 However,
harmonization has not progressed as quickly as most would like. 142
Most WIPO members hope for the passage of a harmonization agree-
ment by the year 2000.143 This may be too late, however, as most
developing countries and some of the new Soviet republics will have
established patent systems by that time. The Patent Harmonization
Treaty, 44 held at the Hague in June of 1991, was one step in the
speedy achievement of international harmonization. The harmoniza-
tion treaty works toward the goal of uniformity by having individual
patent offices recognize the examination results of other offices.145
More comprehensive solutions to solving the need for complete
international harmonization exist. Some solutions have already been
incorporated on a small scale in Europe and in Africa. The first step
involves determining which of two paths is best suited for uniformity.
The first option is to have one common law valid in all countries.146
The second option is to gradually harmonize the different laws of
countries.147 The Council of Europe has chosen to follow the latter
path. 148 However, both paths can be pursued simultaneously since
they lead in the same direction and supplement one another.149 In-
deed, given the vast number of issues to be reconciled, WIPO could
141. H. Bardehle, The Future of the Patent System from a User's Point of View, 29 INDUS.
PROP. 58, 59 (1990).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 60.
144. See First Part of the Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of a Treaty Supple-
menting the Paris Convention as Far as Patents Are Concerned, 30 INDUS. PROP. 360 (1991).
145. Bardehle, supra note 141, at 60.
146. Von Holstein, supra note 24, at 203.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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best harmonize by seeking one common law on some issues while try-
ing to coordinate the different laws of countries on other issues.
The Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registra-
tion of Marks 50 provides a possible system to internationalize pat-
ents. The Madrid Agreement's system is not unlike that proposed in
the harmonization treaty held at the Hague in June of 1991. The Ma-
drid Agreement provides for international protection of a patent once
approved at one office. 15' Other offices reserve the right to oppose
automatically extending protection. This procedure, already imple-
mented in the trademark area, is also possible in the field of patents. 
52
The present discussion will focus on other workable examples of mul-
tinational harmonization specifically in the field of patent law.
A. The European Economic Community Model
The European Economic Community ("EEC") model serves as a
workable existing example in the patent area. The EEC initiated a
movement toward patent law harmonization due to court decisions
holding that patents territoriality violated the Treaty of Rome.' 53 The
goal of the EEC model was to adopt a system of classifying patents
under "International Classifications.' 5 4  Under the EEC system,
which sets out certain uniform principles for all parties to follow, each
country could apply this international classification as the principal or
the subsidiary system in its territory. 55
The EEC's efforts to harmonize the patent system culminated in
the European Patent Convention of 1973156 and the Community Pat-
ent Convention of 1975.57 The European Patent Convention estab-
lished a single application for a European patent that would afford it
protection in the territories of all parties to the Convention. 5 8 It also
established a central patent office to examine European patent appli-
cations. 159 The Convention regulates procedural and substantive laws
on issues relating to granting a patent and establishes the grounds
150. See Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 779 (1990).
151. Bardehle, supra note 141, at 60.
152. Id.
153. Thomas I. Vanaskie, The European Patent Convention, 1 A.S.I.L.S. INT'L LJ. 73, 81-
83 (1977).
154. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, supra note 49, at 17.
155. Id.
156. Europen Patent Convention, supra note 32.
157. Community Patent Convention, supra note 33.
158. European Patent Convention, supra note 32.
159. Wolfeld, supra note 3, at 242.
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upon which courts may invalidate a European patent. 16° Under this
framework, each state is free to determine the effect of patents within
its territory. 161 Once a patent is awarded, it functions as the
equivalent of any national patent within the member states. 162
The Community Patent Convention system varies in that an in-
ventor need only apply for a patent in one EEC country which, if
granted, will remain effective in all member states. 163 The Commu-
nity patent is enforceable in all European countries through the court
of one member nation, which must follow the post-grant patent law as
described in the Community Patent Convention. 64 Though the codi-
fied law of the Community Patent Convention is not as detailed and
broad as that of the Afro-Malagasy or Scandinavian Patent sys-
tems, 165 it still provides a unified base from which the patent system
can function. 166 The Community Patent Convention system elimi-
nates many of the administrative burdens and allows more efficient
utilization of the limited resources and manpower of the patent sys-
tems of the European countries. 167 It also incorporates guidelines for
the courts to follow, making the model an attractive one for WIPO to
emulate or incorporate into its proposed scheme.
B. Afro-Malagasy Model
Like the European Patent Convention, the Afro-Malagasy
model 168 established a regional patent office and all countries sub-
scribe to a common Patent Act.169 The Afro-Malagasy model is espe-
cially useful to members who lack funds and manpower because it
eliminates a need for individual patent offices. The Afro-Malagasy
model was initially motivated by the independence of the former
French colonies in Africa.170 This independence resulted in a lack of
clear guidelines on patent applications and regulations.' 7 1 The Afro-
Malagasy model, like the EEC model, provided for a single patent
160. European Patent Convention, supra note 32, art. 36.
161. DEMARET, supra note 37, at 94.
162. Id.
163. Community Patent Convention, supra note 33, arts. 2, 3.
164. Id. art. 2(2).
165. See text accompanying notes 169-181.
166. Wolfeld, supra note 3, at 244.
167. Id.
168. Afro-Malagasy Model, supra note 36.
169. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, supra note 49, at 16.
170. ANDERFELT, supra note 2, at 105.
171. Id.
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granted by the regional patent office that is separately valid in all
member countries.1 72 Consequently, even if one nation revokes the
enforceability of a patent within its territory, that patent remains in
force in all the other member countries. Additionally, the entire ap-
plication process and all communications with the office are in a sin-
gle language, French.173 The Afro-Malagasy model is one of the most
comprehensive examples of international patent co-operation cur-
rently in existence.
174
C. Nordic Patent
The Scandinavian countries have agreed to a Nordic Committee
to harmonize the current patent system and to implement new regula-
tions. The provisions of the Nordic model are similar to the Afro-
Malagasy model. 175 The Nordic model provides that a patent granted
by any one of the member countries will be effective in all of them. 176
The Nordic system also allows each member to grant a Nordic as well
as a national patent that is enforceable in all member nations. 177 The
major variation between the two models is that the Nordic model is
not monitored through a central patent office.178
The study of this model is significant for several reasons. First,
the Nordic model provides another example of a comprehensive pat-
ent harmonization scheme that regulates pre- and post-grant patent
law. More importantly, the Nordic model serves as an existing exam-
ple of a comprehensive system among developed and industrially ac-
tive countries. 79 Furthermore, the Nordic patent system has enabled
the member states to "better meet the present needs of industry and
absorb new international trends."180 The development of the Nordic
model also encouraged participants to add new provisions permitting
chemical compounds, foods, and drugs to become patentable.' 8 ' The
172. Afro-Malagasy Model, supra note 36, art. 1.
173. ANDERFELT, supra note 2, at 105.
174. Wolfeld, supra note 3, at 248.
175. Id. at 239.
176. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, supra note 49, at 17-18.
177. Berndt Godenhielm, The Scandinavian Patent Community, 4 INDUS. PROP. 13
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179. Wolfeld, supra note 3, at 239.
180. S. Lewin, Introductory Remarks Concerning the Swedish Patent Act Following the
1978 Revision, 18 INDUS. PROP. 22 (1979).
181. Id. Lewin also suggests that the Nordic patent Committee also provided for the pub-
lication of patent applications 18 months after the priority date. Id.
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benefits of a harmonization scheme to industrial countries are just as
prevalent as the benefits to the lesser developed countries. The Nor-
dic model demonstrates the applicability of a comprehensive harmo-
nization system to all countries, whether industrially advanced or not.
D. Patent Cooperation Treaty
The Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT")' 82 resulted from
WIPO's efforts to implement a greater degree of international cooper-
ation. The PCT permits an inventor to file a single application for
protection in as many party nations as he desires.18 3 Although the
PCT also provides a central receiving office to determine if patent ap-
plications meet the requirements it outlines, this is the extent of the
harmonization. 8 4 The receiving office functions as a filtering stage
for collecting and inspecting applications that are then distributed to
each nation designated by the inventor. 185 Although this procedure
minimizes the burden on the applicant, it still results in repetitive ef-
fort with respect to the prosecution of the patents in the chosen na-
tions. The PCT extends inconsistent protection to the patent in the
different countries because it does not provide control over, or uni-
formity in, the individual states' patent laws.
E. Languages
While establishing uniformity in international patent law, WIPO
should also emphasize a uniform language. This would simplify the
transfer of technology between states1 6 and eliminate the possibility
of translation mistakes. This idea has already begun fermenting in
many international organizations.187 Additionally, a uniform lan-
guage would reduce the cost of maintaining the international patent
office, because each patent grant will not have to be translated into
multiple different languages. 8 8
WIPO should move quickly to implement a uniform language.
182. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645 [hereinafter Patent Coop-
eration Treaty].
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have to translate them, court cases are very rare. They are especially rare if the laws applied to
the patents are uniform. Id.
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The need for a uniform language will inevitably arise in patents, as
well as in commercial and technical communication. 18 9 The earlier a
uniform language is in place, the less shock to the international com-
munity, and the fewer difficulties in later adjusting patent systems to a
new language.190 Currently, WIPO's draft patent harmonization
treaty includes a provision requiring applications to be filed in
English. 191
VIII. CONCLUSION
WIPO should lead the nations of the world in implementing a
uniform system of international patents. However, its attempts to
harmonize patent law must first simplify an already complex proce-
dure. 1 9 2 At the same time, WIPO should make every effort to imme-
diately implement this system. The new Soviet republics have to
adopt a patent system now that the Soviet Union has dissolved and its
new patent law is no longer binding. The field of biotechnology will
require individual countries to accommodate its discoveries with
changes in their patent laws. These events will give rise to divergent
biotechnology patent laws in the new Soviet republics and the world
in the field of biotechnology. Consequently, WIPO should act imme-
diately, incorporating these concerns.
Similarly, WIPO should maintain the first to file system because
it is the least burdensome method of determining the actual inventor.
In this context, convincing the United States to change to a first to file
system would be easier than changing the world to a first to invent
basis. However, WIPO should adopt the United States grace period.
The grace period serves the interests of scientists without greatly af-
fecting the process of determining the inventor. WIPO's philosophy
of compromise between the United States and European views will
serve well to accomplish its goals of international harmonization.
WIPO's proposed system will work in the United States, as well as the
European and Japanese patents systems.
In implementing the international system, WIPO should heed
other concerns as well. WIPO should establish a central patent office
that would function under a single language. This system would min-
imize the multiplicity of effort that is so prevalent in the patent world
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. News and Comment, supra note 101, at 3.
192. Gall, supra note 26, at 142.
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today. WIPO's system should also accommodate the needs of devel-
oping countries as they fit into the international patent arena.
Although WIPO has a number of options, the Afro-Malagasy model
offers a workable example of a centralized patent office. WIPO could
also borrow from the Nordic or European patent models, which uni-
versally recognize a patent if any single country recognizes it. Before
implementing such a step, however, most countries must have similar
patent rules so that all members will recognize the patents granted by
other countries.
WIPO will best achieve its goal of harmonization by both seeking
uniformity in the patent laws of all countries and establishing a cen-
tralized patent system to regulate international patent law. Since
speedy implementation is essential, WIPO must pursue both harmoni-
zation and uniformity simultaneously. These efforts alone may lead
to improvements in countries' patent systems, as the Nordic efforts
have succeeded among the Scandinavian countries. Rewards from
harmonizing the international patent system will appear as WIPO
proceeds towards its goals, as well as after WIPO completes its work.
Although this Comment has addressed the controversial issues in
international patent law and offered some viable solutions, they are
not the only options. This Comment should serve as an outline of
specific areas of concern with suggestions for attacking these
problems. As WIPO proceeds toward unifying the international pat-
ent system, it will have to resolve issues of practicality and resistance
to change. For example, although courts need to apply case law uni-
formly, methods of unifying the case law remain at the discretion of
the international community. However, this Comment intends to
stress the benefits in acting immediately to establish a uniform inter-
national patent system. The list of existing obstacles to unifying the
system will only increase if WIPO delays the process.
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